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Abstract
“Trade computation for communication whenever possi-
ble” has been the conventional wisdom to save bandwidth
and power in wireless domain. We glanced at the merg-
ing trends of technology and the applications, and identi-
fied a number of areas where the processor cycles can be
traded for network bandwidth. These areas are - file trans-
fer, shared document edits, remote authentication, and veri-
fication of remotely available codes. We collect and present
some of the theory-paradigms that have given birth to re-
sults potentially usable towards saving bandwidth at the
cost of computation. We hope to make a case for incorpo-
rating the insights collected in this paper from various fields
of complexity theory, into the design of network protocols
for the future. In the penumbra of this over-arching goal,
we also suggest how the engine of “Probabilistic Check-
ing of Proofs” (PCP) can be used for remote authentica-
tion purposes, resulting in much smaller network overhead
and leading to very efficient usage of bandwidth and power.
While this seems to be an interesting route, we then present
the algorithmic challenges that need be solved and argue
why such a theoretical cranking may be just as worth.
1 Introduction
Exchange of information between two (or multiple)
parties can be effected in various modes. On one extreme,
the entire information is generated at one site and then
disseminated to the rest of the group. In another extreme,
every party (if possible) computes the information indepen-
dent of the others and no one needs to go to the network.
Real life, however, often presents scenarios situated in the
middle, i.e., when parties hold partial information and they
need to bothcompute and communicate. In fact, many
a times, it is possible that computation can be traded off
with communication andvice versa. It so turns out that
the possibility of such a trade-off can be used to various
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advantages to handle resource limitations more efficiently.
In this paper we explore one direction for this trade-off,viz.
trading computation for communication. First, we survey
why and when this could be helpful. And next we will
suggest some theoretical techniques that, although awaiting
certain mathematical and algorithmic challenges to be met,
could prove extremely helpful.
Why Save Communication?
Although modern wireless technology has advanced
quite rapidly, it is yet to catch up with the remarkable speed
of the CPUs that have been achieved. The primary obstacle
behind this lag is the presence of natural physical noise
that any wireless signal has to wade through, especially
in the domain of long range transmission. Consequently,
still now, for many wireless applications, bandwidth is a
more priced resource than the processor. Moreover, as
computing is becoming ubiquitous in nature, and more
and more pervasive applications are surfacing, there is a
plethora of devices in the market that are small, wearable or
hand-held, connected on wireless and operating on battery;
for such devices power consumption is quite critical. Sadly,
long range wireless transmission is extremely expensive
compared to on-chip computing as far as the currency
of energy is concerned. For example, according to an
observation made by Pottie and Kaiser, that dates back
couple of years, transmission of one bit over a long range
wireless is equivalent to few thousands of cycles in modern
processors [10]. If the scenario has changed in next few
years, it is only to the favor of processing power and speed.
Where Can Communication be saved
Bandwidth and power are the two motivating factors be-
hind conserving communication for mobile wireless sys-
tems. There are numerous situations in which communica-
tion can be saved by additional computation; here is a short
list:
• Compression while transferring files : This is the most
common scenario. Large files can be compressed, the
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overhead is that of compression and decompression
and the gains are dependent upon the efficiency of the
algorithms used as well as the exact input.
• Document Exchange: Consider two parties A and B
updating a single document. They may hold slightly
different version of the same file; if A wants to know
the contents of B’s document, it may be possible to
smartly compare their edits with a much lower com-
munication overhead than transferring the whole file.
• Remote Authentication: This is a scenario which is
becoming extremely commonplace given the applica-
tion and technology trends. Remote users need to be
authenticated quite often, and the paradigm of pass-
word based authentication is gradually being replaced
by other authentication mechanisms, such as biomet-
rics or key-stroke dynamics and so on. These authenti-
cation keys are quite large in size and typically the ap-
plications require authentication on a continual basis.
Naive implementation of such systems therefore leads
to huge communication overhead resulting just from
the act of authentication alone. While the large size
and high entropy of such keys are quite desirable secu-
rity features, they poses the bandwidth bottleneck. It
may be possible to improve the bandwidth requirement
of such schemes by carefully modifying the associated
verification protocol, which saves the bandwidth, yet
at the same time, retains the benefits of a high-entropy
authentication token. A point to note here is that sim-
ple cryptographic hashing of the key will not work.
Because, typically, the biometric patterns generated by
a person at different times and to different sensors are
not identical, rather close matches. However, a crypto-
graphic hash function does not preserve such proxim-
ities and therefore the distance between two patterns
cannot be obtained by comparing their hash digests.
• Verification of Mobile Codes and Remote Compu-
tations: Internet cookies are no strangers to any one
now. However, installing programs downloaded from
remote locations can be quite sensitive to the security
and privacy issues. It would be really nice if a remote
code came with a certification that it does not perform
harmful action. As of today, the only certification
attached to such a code is the trustworthiness of the
party from which it has been downloaded. However,
a more convincing proof will be a complete listing of
its behavior on different input condition that a user
can verify. Quite naturally, such a proof will be really
long will take a cause the user a long time to verify.
A similar situation would arise in cyber-foraging
which is often discussed as an upshot of computing
becoming pervasive. In cyber-foraging, a small device
with limited computation hands over a heavy-duty
processing to a larger machine. When the result is
handed back, it is not clear how efficiently the small
device could be assured of the correctness of the result.
Again, a proof, which would be unreasonably long,
could be attached, but the verification of such a proof
will not only eat away all the processor cycles that
were to be saved at the first place, but will also choke
the bandwidth completely because of its exponential
size.
Goals of this paper
The ambition in this position-paper is four-fold. First, we
start on the note of a conventional wisdom that communica-
tion should be purchased at the cost of additional processing
where bandwidth and power are scarce, and identify the
areas falling within the scope of such a trade-off. Second,
we collect and present some of the theory-paradigms (
viz., Communication Complexity Theory, Randomized
Approximation Algorithms, and Probabilistic Checking of
Proofs) that have given birth to results potentially usable
in this regard. And we believe that such paradigms have a
lot more to offer to the applied-research community. Third,
we make an interesting observation that the techniques
of Probabilistic Checking of Proofs can be exploited to
develop a new remote authentication protocol that results
in huge savings in bandwidth(and power). We show how
to transform a remote authentication problem to benefit
from the proof-checking framework. And finally, we bring
out the algorithmic challenges that need be handled. In
part, these hurdles are theoretical, and in part, these are
the implementation difficulties of an extremely messy and
intricate system.
We first present a quick and cursory survey of how in
the various situations discussed above, communication
can be saved. While data compression is too diverse in
nature over various application domains, the subject is
quite well-studied at the same time, and hence lies outside
the scope of this article. We briefly mention some of
the results derived by the theoreticians in the domain of
document exchange. One of our goals is to stimulate the
interest of applied research community to integrate these
results into real life systems. Such a task is often quite
non-trivial and comes only after overcoming a series of
engineering hurdles. Next, we discuss the issue of remote
authentication. Here we first point out an interesting
solution, viz. Probabilistic Checking of Proofs (PCP)
[1] that can be applied as a generic mechanism to save
bandwidth and power. For Remote Authentication, we
propose a new protocol that uses the PCP-trick so that the
entire authentication-key need not be transmitted. Instead,
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a very small fraction of the key would be enough for the
verifier at a remote end to validate a user’s identity.
The paradigm of proof checking has deeper connections
with complexity theory and error correction. In a nutshell,
any problem in NP1 can be cast as a problem where a
prover is producing some proof and a verifier is verifying
the same, and in this process the verifier is looking into
only a small fraction of it instead of the whole proof. This
is very counter intuitive, and will be discussed with little
more details in section 3. Authentication however, seems
to readily fit into a prover-verifier framework. But we
reformulate it in a slightly different way in section 4. The
reason for reformulating the problem is to make it resemble
the prover-verifier version of an NP problem. That helps us
use the trick of checking only a small fraction of bits in the
proof, i.e., in our case, it suffices to transmit only a small
fraction of a large authentication key over the network.
It is worth mentioning thatPCP builds upon the results
from Theory of Error Correction which in turn is based
on polynomials over mathematical structures called Finite
Fields. The techniques used in probabilistic checking of
a proof relies on a bunch of other results related to many
properties of low degree polynomials [12, 11, 4, 6]. The
interesting challenge from a systems point of view is to
integrate these theoretical notions into an implementable
authentication system.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next
section describes the paradigm of communication complex-
ity; we discuss very briefly the main objective of this the-
ory and how it connects to the areas where communication
can be saved at the cost of additional computation. In sec-
tion 3 we introduce the preliminary concept of a prover-
verifier game that is at the basis of PCP. In the same sec-
tion we define the notion of PCP as well. In section 4,
we cast the remote authentication problem as an instance
of prover-verifier game and demonstrate how the fruits of
PCP-theorem can be harnessed in that setting. Our discus-
sion on PCP culminates in section 5 where we present the
PCP-based protocol for remote authentication. In section 6
we present the algorithmic design challenges that arise in
the context of implementing PCP-based protocols. We fi-
nally conclude in section 7.
2 Communication Complexity
Communication Complexity Theory [5] is a relatively
younger branch of theoretical computer science that offers
a different angle to understand many complexity theoretic
questions such as lower bounds of problems, circuit depth
etc. However, researchers gradually realized the immense
1The class of problems solvable by Nondeterministic Turing Machine
in Polynomial Time
scope that the subject opens up even for practical real life
problems. In this section, we start with a quick tour of
Communication Complexity, and then discuss how the
fruits of this theory can be used for areas such as Document
Exchange and Remote Authentication. Fundamentally we
deal with the following abstract question :
Suppose A and B are two parties trying to compute a
function f(x, y) of two variablesx and y. A has x in
possession, but noty. Similarly, B hasy, but notx. There
is no limitation assumed on the computational power of A
and B. Without any loss of generality we can assume that
the size of these two inputs are same,i. ., |x| = |y| = n.
The question is: “what is the minimum number of bits that
need to be exchanged between A and B so that both can
computef ” ?
An obvious and trivial answer isn, because both A and B
can send their respective inputs to each other and thereafter
compute the function privately. But it turns out that depend-
ing on the nature of the function (f ) to be computed, one
can take smarter steps and reduce the required communica-
tion significantly. As a trivial, yet illustrative, example, if
x andy are two lists of numbers, ([x1, . . . xn], [y1 . . . yn])
and the functionf to be computed is the average of all these
numbers, i.e.,f(x, y) = Σixi+Σiyi2n , then quite clearly there
is no need for sending the complete lists across the network.
The basic formulation of the communication complexity
question, however abstract, directly appeals to the need for
saving communication. Drawing upon our discussion in
section 1, these insights can be applied to many problems
that we mentioned. In particular, Document Exchange
and Remote Authentication are two areas where it has
been applied quite successfully, although in arandomized
setting. Randomized communication complexity in prin-
ciple deals with the same question, except the fact that
guarantees for the answers are relaxed to high-probability
cases as opposed to complete determinism. For example,
we may ask, whether two stringsx andy are identical with
a high probability guarantee, say 0.99. Another possibility
is that we want an approximation of the function at the
cost of complete determinism. For examplex and y are
two images and the functionf is a distance between these
images quantifying how different they are; in this case, it
may be useful just to compute an approximate distance
f̂ ≈ f provided communication can be saved substantially.
Now we present some examples of where the notion
communication complexity has been applied. One of
them is Document Exchange. In this case, it is mostly
not necessary to transfer whole documents between two
parties. This problem has been studied by quite a few
researchers. For example, Orlitsky [7] showed that this
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can be achieved inΩ(h. log n) time provided the two files
do not differ in more thanh positions (the number of
positions where they differ is also known as the Hamming
Distance). In a more recent result, Cormodeet al. showed
that it is useful to conceive of a new distance between the
documents, called thedit distancewhich quantifies the
number of edits necessary to transform one copy of the
document to the other [3]. The edit distance is a metric.
However, instead of directly computing the edit distance,
it turns out easier to transform this distance into Hamming
Distance and then proceed thenceforth.
Approximating the Hamming Distance is an interesting
question. In a rather negative result Pang and Gamal
showed that the communication complexity of this problem
is Ω(n), even in a probabilistic case [8]. Therefore, it is
theoretically impossible to obtain a two sidedε-bound,
i.e.,it is impossible to achieve an estimation̂h (the esti-
mated hamming distance) ofh (the original distance) so
that (1 − ε)h ≤ ĥ ≤ (1 + ε)h holds for all0 ≤ ε ≤ 1
with arbitrary high probability. However, the results in
[3] how a one sided bound can be tightly achieved; in
particular these results describe an approximation scheme
that underestimates the Hamming Distance between two
strings only with a negligible probability.
Such results are quite theoretical in nature. And, as
with the case of most randomized systems, a naive imple-
mentation is often fraught with an unacceptable abundance
of negative outcomes. Such systems need extensive
experimentation and parameter tuning before real-life
deployment. In a very recent work, Paulet al. showed how
the approximation technique for Hamming Distance can
be applied to Remote Authentication Systems [9]. They
borrow the theoretical notion of approximating Hamming
Distance computation from [3] and describe a structured,
systematic experimental methodology on how to deploy the
theory in practice, in addition to proving other theoretical
bounds. It turns out that Hamming Distance computing
fits in the core of a diverse range of pattern-matching algo-
rithms used in many biometric devices, such as finger print
identifiers or iris-scan recognizers and so on. Their results,
although not extremely accurate and should be taken more
as ball-park figures, show that such randomized Hamming
Distance computation can yield a power savings of up to
80% in a Remote Authentication system, while degrading
the security guarantee for the authentication only negligibly.
The moral of the whole story that bred itself in our dis-
cussion of Communication Complexity Theory, is that there
have already been quite a few encouraging results that can
be directly borrowed while developing several components
of computer networks of the future, and that to the strongest
belief of these authors, there are many more problems that
deserve attention from this new theoretical angle offering
practical gains.
3 PCP Preliminaries
In this section we keep our focus on remote authen-
tication. However, we want to suggest a new solution
framework, viz., the Probabilistic Checking of Proofs
(PCP), for this domain. We first show that the problem
of remote authentication can be reformulated as a two
party Prover-Verifier game. In this framework we can
immediately apply the notion of PCP and the associated
techniques to illustrate how to cut down the number of
transmitted bits. As a final assimilation we describe our
protocol. We start with defining the infrastructure, viz., the
Prover-Verifier game.
3.1 Prover-Verifier Game andPCP
Any computational decision problem essentially means
deciding a question likex ∈ L? , wherex is a string and
L is a language, both over the same alphabet2. A machine
essentially decides this set inclusion problem. The hardness
of the problem depends on the lower bound on the time
the machine would take in deciding the question. Our two
party setting consists of the following : (i) The Prover (Pr
), who has an unlimited computational power, and (ii) The
Verifier (Vf ) who has polynomial amount of computational
resources. The game is the following:Pr is trying to prove
to Vf that some stringx belongs to some languageL. Pr
can produce evidence in the form of bit strings andVf will
use his limited computational power (in terms of space and
time ) and verify the question ifx ∈ L?.
Definition 1 NP is the class of languages, such that∀L ∈
NP , and for a stringx ∈ L, Pr can always present a string
y of lengthO(poly(n)) (n is the length ofx), such that tak-
ing x andy as inputs,Vf can verify the claim ( viz.,x ∈ L )
in O(poly(n) time.y is called the certificate forx.
The above definition is exactly equivalent to the standard
definition that NP is the set of all languages that can
be decided by a Non Deterministic Turing Machines in
polynomial time.
PCP has a randomized setting. This is almost identical
to the Prover-Verifier game that we described before. How-
ever, in addition to the certificate stringy (and the original
input stringx ), Vf generates a random bit stringr of poly-
nomial length. Vf is going to take three strings as input,
viz., r, y, x but while deciding ifx ∈ L, it is not going to
use all the bits ofy but only a selective few (depending on
r ) and still decides withhigh probability if x ∈ L .
2An alphabet is a set of symbols
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Definition 2 PCP (r(n), q(n)) denotes the set of lan-
guages for which the random stringr has lengthr(n) and
Vf can look onlyq(n) number of bits from the certificate
string y and still be able to decide with high probability if
x ∈ L.
Having set up the framework, we now introduce the cele-
brated PCP-theorem [1] that we are going to use to design
our authentication protocol.
Theorem 1
NP = PCP (O(log n),O(1))
In other words, the verifierVf uses onlyO(log n) random
bits (r) and samples onlyconstant number of bits from the
certificate string provided byPr , to resolve ifx ∈ L.
Why PCP ?
PCP theorem stated above is remarkably strong. Once the
prover prepares a proof (or certificate) with appropriate
encoding, the verifier needs only to randomly look into
a few (constant number) of its bits and will be able to
decide with a very high probability ifx ∈ L. We can
use this trick for remote authentication. It is intuitively
clear that we are trying to design a Verifier for our remote
authentication system that will need to sample only a
few bits ( constant number - to be exact) instead of the
entire authentication key which may be quite large. To
be able to exploit this principle, we need to reformulate
our authentication mechanism as aPCP instance, which
we do in the next section. There are couple of advantages
in using PCP-based protocols for remote authentication,
over the techniques suggested in [9]. First, the estimated
transmission requirement isO(1) (constant) in the case
of PCP, as opposed toO(log n) in [9]. And second, a
PCP-based protocol is quite generic in nature, while the
other is limited to the approximation of Hamming Distance.
We feel it may be helpful for the reader’s understand-
ing to include an intuitive discussion on howPCP works.
Consider the verifier’s task in the normal case. The prover
provides a certificatey, and the verifier computes the veri-
fication functionv(y); if v(y) = 1, the verifier accepts that
x ∈ L else it rejects. Now, it turns out that the prover can
encode the certificatey in a special way. Error Correction
Codes come in pretty handy in such encoding. Typically,
an error correcting code maps smaller dimensional strings
(messages) to strings of larger dimensions (codewords) en-
suring that the codewords are sufficiently far from each
other. In the case of PCP, we resort to a special kind of error
correction code that also takes into account the verification
function v(y). Which works in the following way. Con-
sider two stringsα andβ, so thatv(α) = 1 andv(β) = 0.
In other words,α is a proper certificate whileβ is not. Now,
we can design a special kind of code that mapsα andβ far
apart from each other. Suppose the encoding function isE
andE(α) = α′ andE(β) = β′. Now, thatα′ andβ′ are
sufficiently different from each other, it becomes possible to
distinguish between them by sampling much smaller num-
ber of bits (than their original lengths). Although the exact
construction of such a code is quite complicated and be-
yond the scope of this paper, in a nutshell, this captures the
intuition behind thePCP framework. The prover uses the
encodingE to encode its certificate. The verifier is able to
distinguish an honest certificate (encoded) from a bad one
by sampling only a constant number of bits.
4 Remote Authentication as a Prover Verifier
game
In this section we cast the problem of remote authen-
tication as a two party game. In particular we consider
the scenario of a user remotely authenticating himself to a
server, using a large token such as a biometric sample. The
user provides a user id, sayU and a tokenb. The server
can access a database which has a templatebU known to
be the identifier forU . Once presented withb, the server
computes the distanced(b, bU ) between the two samples,
and if d(b, bU ) is small enough, it approvesU . Notice that
d() is specific to the nature of the pattern used.
Now, we can think of the aforementioned scenario as a
language recognition problem as follows :
Let L be the set of all possible tokens that can be gener-
ated byU . If the token is a fingerprint, thenL consists of
all possible fingerprints thatU may generate. Typically, the
fingerprints taken from a person are not exactly identical
to each other; they vary slightly depending on the inherent
sensor inaccuracy, exact condition of the thumb and so on.
WhenU requests the server for authentication, the question
the server really asks is - ifbU ∈ L?. The answer is
obviously affirmative if the user is reallyU . However, if the
person is an imposter and notU then he would potentially
generate another languageLv 6= L so thatbU /∈ Lv. To
prove the identity, the user gives one biometric sample of
his own, which plays his certificate to the server. If the user
is reallyU , then he can give a sampleb such thatd(b, bU )
is quite small. However for some other personV 6= U ,
it won’t be possible to give such a biometric sample. To
summarize, the process of remote authentication can be
thought of as a two party game, where the server plays
the role ofVf , the user plays the role ofPr , the template
tokenbU in the server database is the input string (calledx
in Definition 1 ). The user (or the proverPr ) provides the
certificate stringb (denoted byy in Definition 1 ).
Now we can present the above scenario in aPCP set-
ting. The question asked is - ifbU ∈ L ? The work
required to resolve the question is computing the distance
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d(b, bU ). This computation is typically a finger print recog-
nition or a scanned retinal image matching or something
similar depending upon the kind of pattern being used.
There are polynomial time algorithms available for these
pattern matching problems. So the decision question is in
NP . Hence, We can now appeal to Theorem 1 which asserts
the existence of a randomized algorithmA such that given
a random stringr of logarithmic length,Vf (the server) can
runA onr, bU and onlyO(1) number of bits ofb and decide
with very high probability ifbU ∈ L, i.e., approve (or dis-
approve) the user at the remote end. This is the focal point
of this paper. OncePr andVf agrees on the random string
r, Pr needs to present toVf only a very small number of
bytes from its authentication token. And by the strength of
Theorem 1,Vf will still be able to decide whetherPr is an
authorized person or not. Normally the biometric sample
will be quite large in size, usually a few hundreds of kilo-
bytes. Instead, in our setting only a very small fraction of
that needs to be communicated over the network. The string
r is also logarithmically small compared tob resulting in a
very small overhead of communication. In fact, ifPr andVf
share the same pseudo-random-number generator (PRNG),
then even that communication becomes unnecessary. This
leads to the final protocol which we summarize in the fol-
lowing section.
5 The Remote Authentication protocol
All the previous discussion culminates in constructing
our protocol. We stick to the same notation used so far to
denote the parties and input strings of our problem.
1. Pr sends his user-idU to Vf .
2. Vf generates a small number of random bits (logarith-
mic in the size of the expected biometric sample) and
sends this string (r) to Pr . This step is not required if
the two parties share the same PRNG.
3. Pr computes fromr and the encoded version ofb, a
small samplebc ( ofO(1) length ) and sends this toVf
.
4. Vf runs a computation withr, bu andbc as inputs and
decides the authorization. This becomes possible by
the result ofPCP theorem.
The above protocol has the following characteristics.
• The communication overhead associated with a remote
authentication is reduced by a significant amount.
• Since an additional level of encryption of information
takes place in order to transmit the data, this will of-
fer at least one extra level of protection on top of the
normal one offered by a public key infrastructure.
• The whole process of computing the small subset of
bits to be communicated is usually done through tech-
niques of Error Correcting Codes which heavily uses
polynomials and an associated mathematical structure
called Galois field. Although Galois field operations
are somewhat expensive, they are doable in reasonable
time; in fact such operations are used for error correc-
tion in network transmission, or digital storage systems
quite heavily.
6 Discussion: Directions and Challenges
It should be clear by now that PCP technology offers a
neat and attractive design principle for Remote Authenti-
cation. In fact, the same principle has been proposed in
the recent past as an alternative for quick verification of re-
motely executable codes [2]. The main research challenge
however is to effectively design the proofs and the verifi-
cation procedure that can be used in real time. Though it
is gratifying to note that the proof of PCP-theorem is quite
constructive [1], we are still at a distance from using the
technique directly for a remote-authentication or a mobile-
code verification. The reason is the following. The entire
proof of PCP-theorem is based on a well known problem,
viz., 3-CNF-satisfiability3. 3-CNF being an NP-complete
problem, ensures that for any other problem in NP, an equiv-
alent algorithm exists. In our case the verification algorithm
typically does some pattern recognition in polynomial time.
And all we know for sure by the strength ofPCP theorem is
that there exists another equivalent algorithm that performs
the same task, but looks only into a small fraction of the
pattern. However, no one to our knowledge has ever con-
structed such an algorithm. There are a few possible direc-
tions that can be taken to engineer the solution.
• One straightforward way would be to reduce the prob-
lem of pattern recognition into 3CNF and then apply
the algorithm known for 3CNF on the new reduced
form of the problem. This is doable because anything
in NP is reducible to 3CNF.
• Modifying a standard algorithm such as fingerprint
recognition) into one that our protocol can use. This
is based on the same intuition on which the very proof
of PCP-theorem is designed. The idea is the following:
Take a proof and blow up it up in size using a suitable
error correction code such as multivariate Reed-Muller
code (which is used in the PCP-theorem). Clearly, any
arbitrary code will not work; the structure of the code
has to be intrinsically related to the exact verification
function that the verifier would use in a normal setting.
This is an open problem for the theoreticians.
3Conjunctive Normal Form
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• A third design approach is presented in [2]. In this
work, the authors argue, and reasonably so, that it is
more convenient to view a verification algorithm in
the RAM model (random access machine) than in the
Turning Machine model. In a RAM model, a pro-
gram becomes a sequence of assembly level instruc-
tions, such as LOAD, STORE, ADD, MOV and so on.
At this point, the authors show how to convert a set of
RAM instructions into a 3-CNF expression. The rest
of the routine falls in place following the constructive
proof of thePCP -theorem [1].
7 Conclusions
We have focused on the problem of trade-off between
computation and communication. The benefit for trad-
ing computation for communication is two-fold, savings in
bandwidth, and savings in power. For small and mobile de-
vices operating on wireless, especially in the long range
(such as cell-phones), these two resources are very criti-
cal. We glanced at the merging trends of the technology
and the applications and identified a number of areas where
the processor cycles can be traded for network bandwidth.
These areas are - file transfer, shared document edits, re-
mote authentication, and verification of remotely available
codes. We hope to make a case for incorporating the in-
sights collected in this paper from various fields of com-
plexity theory, into the design of the network protocols for
the future. In the penumbra of this over-arching goal, we
focus in particular into an interesting possibility that a pro-
tocol for remote authentication can take advantage of. This
is the framework of Probabilistic Checking of Proofs. We
show how a remote-authentication can be viewed as a PCP
instance through an intuitive yet somewhat non-obvious for-
mulation, which is small yet rather a focused technical con-
tribution of this paper. Finally, we present the algorithmic
challenges that come on the way. It is not clear which of the
paths prescribed in section 6 would be the one offering least
resistance. One of these paths mandates designing new al-
gorithms, which is a theoretical task, yet, if solved, seems
to be the neatest of all. The other two are quite messy in
terms of the coding-complexity but seem to present less of
theoretical barrier otherwise.
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